Wonderfully written and beautifully presented , The Outlaws of Medieval Legend brings the popular heroes of the Middle-Ages to life. Featuring both famous - Robin Hood and William Wallace - and now forgotten rogues such as Gamelyn and Fulke Fitzwarin, this book explains the popularity of these semi-mythical figures, and how their stories appealed to the common people of the Middle Ages.
Long unavailable, and now featuring a new introduction from the author, this is the perfect book for anyone with a fondness for medieval history and folklore.

The popular heroes of the Middle Ages were semi-mythical figures. This text explores not only the famous Robin Hood and William Wallace, but also some now forgotten rogues such as Gamelyn and Fulke Fitzwarin. Apart from William Wallace, the heroes of the outlaw legends were not men who played a leading role on the historical stage. Nevertheless, this book reveals how they were remembered in tradition for generations. This book explains the popularity of these figures and looks at how the stories appealed to the common people of the Middle Ages. The author also discusses their origins, spirit and background. In this re-issue of "The Outlaws of Medieval Legend", a new introduction is provided to set the book in the context of recent work on these characters, The titles of which are: "England in the Later Middle Ages" (Routledge, 1975); "Heraldry" (Yale UP, 1986) and "Nobles, Knights and Men at Arms in the Middle Ages" (Hambleden Press, 1996).

Many of the combatants in the European wars of the late middle ages fought for their own gain, but they observed a code of regulations, part chivalrous and part commercial which they called the 'law of arms'. This book, originally published in 1965, examines this soldiers' code, to understand its rules and how they were enforced. How did a soldier sue for ransom money if his prisoner would not pay it, and before what court? How did he know whether what he took by force was lawful spoil? As the answers to these and other questions reveal, the workings of the law of arms gave practical point to the contemporary cult of chivalry. It also had an important influence on the early development of ideas of international law.

Many of the combatants in the European wars of the late middle ages fought for their own gain, but they observed a code of regulations, part chivalrous and part commercial which they called the 'law of arms'. This book, originally published in 1965, examines this soldiers' code, to understand its rules and how they were enforced. How did a soldier sue for ransom money if his prisoner would not pay it, and before what court? How did he know whether what he took by force was lawful spoil? As the answers to these and other questions reveal, the workings of the law of arms gave practical point to the contemporary cult of chivalry. It also had an important influence on the early development of ideas of international law.

Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

In this book Maurice Keen examines the significance of chivalry as a secular social ideal in the period from c. 1100 to c. 1500, and finds that historians have exaggerated both chivalry's early Christian dedication and its later secular decadence, and that it may be better described as an ethos in which martial, aristocratic and Christian elements were fused together. Keen first discusses the secular origins of chivalry and stresses the importance of the development of new cavalry tactics in the late eleventh century, which set apart the knights - mounted warriors - as a separate and privileged group. The launching of the crusades sharpened existing ideas about their Christian role at about the same time, and rituals for making new knights gave definition to chivalry as an aristocratic order. The appearance in the twelfth century of a secular literature of knighthood did something more, endowing chivalry with an historical mythology of its own. The stories of Charlemagne and Arthur furnished a store of prestigious models of chivalrous values in action. the ideals of knighthood could be symbolically expressed, and the heralds, as experts in its history, literature and rituals, became a kind of secular priesthood of chivalry. Their learning helped to render the chivalry of the late middle ages ornate and often extravagant - a development which has led many historians to categorise it as decadent. Keen argues, however, that the attention lavished on externals in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and exemplified in the pageantry of tournaments and the ceremonials of such famous secular orders of chivalry as the Garter and the Golden Fleece, was not just empty show: it was rather an attempt to give expression, in a vivid and evocative manner, to the values and virtues of chivalry. The cult of honour, which seeks to give merit and loyal service their due reward in reputation and social respect, was at the heart of the chivalric ideal. high status and a privileged way of life impose was the most important legacy of chivalry to later times, and it had a profound influence in consequence on the political mentality of the aristocracies of early modern Europe.

The literature of chivalry and of courtly love has left an indelible impression on western ideas. What is less clear is how far the contemporary warrior aristocracy took this literature to heart and how far its ideals had influence in practice, especially in war. These are questions that Maurice Keen is uniquely qualified to answer. This book is a collection of Maurice Keen's articles and deals with both the ideas of chivalry and the reality of warfare. He discusses brotherhood-in-arms, courtly love, crusades, heraldry, knighthood, the law of arms, tournaments and the nature of nobility, as well as describing the actual brutality of medieval warfare and the lure of plunder. While the standards set by chivalric codes undoubtedly had a real, if intangible, influence on the behaviour of contemporaries, chivalry's idealisation of the knight errant also enhanced the attraction of war, endorsing its horrors with a veneer of acceptability.